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Abstract: A Personal Contract Purchase (PCP) plan is an innovative, complex and increasingly popular form of 
car finance. Consumers pay a deposit and monthly payments, but instead of paying off the total value of the 
car, they pay off the depreciation over a specified term. We used an experiment to investigate 
comprehension of PCP plans and scope for improving it through information disclosure and consumer advice. 
A representative sample of consumers (n=100) completed choice tasks, product rating tasks and multiple 
choice questions to measure the accuracy of consumers’ decisions and extent of comprehension. Disclosures 
designed to improve the processing of mileage and cost information varied between participants. The tasks 
were also undertaken before and after reading an advice document. The results revealed poor understanding 
of PCP plans based on information typically disclosed by car dealers. Participants also made mistakes, often 
rating objectively worse offers more favourably than superior ones. The alternative disclosures were 
ineffective, but consumer advice sheets did improve comprehension and reduce mistakes. A sheet with a 
graphical explanation outperformed one with only text. We conclude that the complexity of PCP plans raises 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
For many households, the purchase of a car represents the second largest financial transaction 
they undertake. The impact of innovations in car finance on consumer decisions is therefore 
an important research issue with potentially substantial implications for consumer policy. 
Probably the most prominent innovation in recent times is the Personal Contract Purchase 
(PCP) plan, which has received little attention from consumer researchers heretofore. PCP 
plans typically involve lower monthly payments than Hire Purchase (HP) deals or personal 
loans, allowing consumers to benefit from increased affordability. However, PCP plans are 
also relatively complex and involve potential drawbacks that may, or may not, be properly 
understood by consumers. The present paper employs an experimental study to investigate 
the extent of consumer comprehension of PCPs and to explore scope for improvement in 
understanding through the provision of consumer advice. As far as we can see, it is the first 
empirical study to investigate consumer comprehension of PCP plans and their impact on 
decision-making. 
 
 
PCP plans operate in a somewhat similar fashion to traditional HP deals, in that the consumer 
acquires a new vehicle by paying an initial deposit followed by regular monthly repayments. 
The innovative element is that rather than paying off the full cost of the car over the term of 
the deal (as they would under HP), the consumer pays off only the depreciation in the car’s 
value. This is calculated as the difference between the retail price and a guaranteed minimum 
future value (GMFV), which forms part of the deal and is subject to agreed conditions in 
relation to maximum mileage allowance and care of the car. At the end of the deal, the car 
can be purchased at the GMFV price, assuming that the consumer can afford the necessarily 
substantial final payment. Otherwise, there are two possibilities. If the car has depreciated 
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less than expected, the consumer can make use of this “equity” as part of a deposit for a new 
PCP plan with the same provider. Alternatively the consumer can simply return the car. 
Evidently, given the above, PCP deals are more complex than previous forms of car finance. 
 
 
It is important to recognise from the outset that PCP deals have advantages and enjoy 
popularity. Because consumers pay off only depreciation, monthly repayments are lower and 
so car purchase is more affordable. In Ireland, where the present study was conducted, a 
majority of car dealerships and brands now market PCP plans as their primary attraction for 
new car buyers. Industry figures show that at the start of 2016 over half of new car sales were 
conducted under a PCP framework.1 The central innovation behind PCP deals originated in 
the United States and is spreading internationally. PCP deals are now available in the United 
Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, South Africa and Russia, with closely similar deals centred 
on monthly repayment of depreciation available also in Australia, Canada, China, 
Switzerland and Germany. 
 
 
Nevertheless, in some countries consumer organisations, regulators and consumer journalists 
have expressed fears about comprehension of PCP plans and associated levels of debt.2 In 
response to such concerns, the UK Financial Conduct Authority began a review of the 
implications of PCP plans for consumers in 2017. There are multiple potential downsides. 
Consumers do not have legal ownership, must abide by mileage limits and conditions of care 
(with negative financial consequences for breaking them) and must shoulder risk associated 
with future second-hand car prices. At the end of the contract, they may also find themselves 
 
 
1 Figures taken from www.motorcheck.ie/blog/car-finance-increases-139-percent. 
2 See www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/motors/car-sales-nervously-reliant-on-pcp-1.3088002; 
www.independent.ie/business/personal-finance/charlie-weston-pcp-car-finance-deals-could-be-a-subprime- 
mess-all-over-again-35331251.html; www.ft.com/content/0e651206-0ee1-11e7-a88c-50ba212dce4d; 
www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jun/10/car-loans-personal-contract-plans-vehicle-financial-crisis-pcp. 
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in a weak negotiating position or effectively tied to a single dealer unless they have sufficient 
liquidity to pay the GMFV and take their business elsewhere. Furthermore, previous 
consumer research in other contexts has shown that consumers may struggle with the 
constructs at the heart of PCP finance, including trade-offs between immediate and future 
costs (Herrmann & Wricke, 1998; Dasgupta, Siddarth & Silva-Risso, 2007), other aspects of 
price framing (Wonder, Wilhelm & Fewings, 2008), non-linearities inherent in interest 
calculations (e.g. Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011) and calibration of likely usage (Grubb, 2009). 
We briefly review relevant studies in the next section. 
 
 
Given this backdrop, consumer policymakers might welcome empirical evidence in relation 
to whether consumers understand the structure and consequences of PCP plans. Consistent 
with the notion of empirically informed regulation advocated by Sunstein (2011), the study 
was undertaken in close collaboration with the Competition and Consumer Protection 
Commission (CCPC) and had the explicit aim of informing relevant consumer policy. 
Specifically, our study set out to address two primary research questions: (i) How well do 
consumers understand PCP plans? (ii) Can understanding be improved? 
 
 
Given the lack of existing literature and exploratory nature of the research questions, the 
investigation employed a controlled laboratory experiment, which permitted a much more 
thorough and controlled investigation than would be possible via a survey. The study began 
by providing a representative sample of 100 consumers with information about PCP finance 
deals of the sort typically distributed by car dealerships. Participants then completed a series 
of computerised tasks. First was an Adaptive Choice Task (ACT) designed to assess 
consistency of decisions, involving a between-subjects comparison of equivalent PCP and HP 
deals. Second was a Rating Scale (RS) task in which participants rated a series of PCP deals 
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for good value, some of which strictly dominated others. Third was a set of Multiple Choice 
Questions (MCQ) that tested explicit comprehension of the key components of PCP deals. 
Participants then experienced one of two interventions involving the provision of detailed 
consumer advice. One originated from the website of Ireland’s Competition and Consumer 
Protection Commission (CCPC), the other was designed by the research team. Following this, 
the fourth task presented a counterbalanced set of MCQs. The fifth and final task involved 
another sequence of RS responses. Changes in pre- and post-intervention performance on 
these measures were used to assess the two interventions. 
 
 
The results raise concerns from a consumer protection perspective. We found that some 
participants were less able to make consistent decisions over PCP deals than over HP deals. 
When rating PCP deals, an offer that was objectively inferior to another was rated more 
highly in around one quarter of judgements. Performance on the initial MCQ questions was 
straightforwardly poor – key elements of PCP deals were not understood. Following exposure 
to the consumer advice, however, performance on the RS and MCQ tasks improved 
significantly. Overall, the study provides initial evidence that consumers struggle to 
comprehend PCP deals, but also that comprehension can be improved by helpful and detailed 
advice. 
 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
 
2.1 Comprehension and Cognitive Load 
 
 
In what follows, we consider the concept of comprehension broadly, to cover not only 
understanding of individual product features but also how features interact and are integrated 
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into judgements and decisions. Although previous studies have not addressed comprehension 
with respect to PCP plans specifically, there is a growing empirical literature on how 
consumers comprehend key components of personal loans, which offers some relevant 
insights. One way to view a PCP deal is that it possesses the same key properties as typical 
consumer loan (principal, term, interest rate, financial cost) plus a number of additional 
features and considerations. Thus, it is a reasonable presumption that many empirical findings 
in relation to personal loans will also apply to PCP plans, but that additional effects may 
result not only from features specific to PCPs but also because additional features increase 
cognitive load. Empirical investigations generally employ either surveys or laboratory 
experiments and one of three types of tasks: judgement tasks, rating/ranking tasks and choice 
tasks. 
 
 
In judgement tasks, respondents are provided with information about a loan and asked to 
estimate another aspect that is determined by the information provided. For instance, they 
may be required to estimate how long it will take to pay off a loan with a given principal, 
monthly repayment (MR) and APR. The non-linearities inherent in these relationships appear 
to cause problems, with consumers underestimating the time to pay off loans (Overton and 
MacFadyen, 1998; Ranyard and Craig, 1995; Yard, 2004) and overestimating the financial 
cost of shorter loans (McHugh, Ranyard & Lewis, 2011). The complexity of interactions 
between components may also explain why, when asked to rate or rank sets of loans, 
participants rank short-term loans with very high APRs above longer term loans with lower 
APRs (Yard, 2004) and do not weight different price components equally in terms of cash 
value (Herrmann and Wricke, 1998). 
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Several choice experiments reveal that consumer decisions over loans are easily influenced 
by superficial aspects of presentation of information, such as the disaggregation of 
repayments into smaller more regular amounts or repayments are just below a salient round 
number (Estelami, 2001). Choices are also sensitive to which of the subset of co-determined 
properties of a loan (principal, APR, term, financial cost) are made explicit at the decision- 
point (McHugh et al., 2011; Lunn, Bohacek & Rybicki, 2016). 
 
 
Generalising from these empirical studies, two points might be emphasised. First, the 
complexity (perhaps especially the non-linearity) of the key relationships that underlie a loan 
biases judgements. This finding is in keeping with the wider literature on financial literacy 
that demonstrates consumers’ difficulty in handling non-linear relationships and interest 
compounding (Stango & Zinman, 2009; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011) and relates individual 
differences to credit decisions (Disney & Gathergood, 2013). Second, the volume of 
information processing leads to inconsistent weighting of loan attributes in decisions. Out of 
necessity, loans involve a variety of interacting factors expressed in a diversity of units of 
measurement (Köcher & Holzmüller, 2014), e.g. € per month, % APR, lump sum deposit, 
accumulated cost of credit. Cognitive processing of individual factors may be taxing even 
before the requirement to integrate them (Homburg, Totzek & Krämer, 2014). 
 
 
A PCP plan is, in essence, a more complex form of loan. Field and laboratory studies suggest 
that product complexity adversely affects consumer decision making. Individuals struggle to 
evaluate complex choices accurately (Jacoby, 1984; Schwartz, 2004; Agnew & Szykman, 
2005) and often ‘satisfice’ by focusing on a subset of the information available (Simon, 
1955). Complex price structures mean consumers often do not pay the lowest price for 
homogenous goods in markets for residential electricity (Wilson & Price, 2010), credit 
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products (Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, & Laibson, 2009; Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, Liu, & 
Souleles, 2015) and broadband internet (Lambrecht & Skiera, 2006). Product complexity 
often leads consumers to choose dominated options (Loewenstein et al, 2017). Laboratory 
evidence shows that consumers’ ability to assess good value deteriorates rapidly as the 
number of compensatory attributes increases (Lunn et al, 2017, forthcoming). 
 
 
Marrying this previous empirical work with the fact that PCPs require additional product 
attributes to be taken into account, including a mileage limit, conditions relating to care, a 
GMFV and contractual conditions surrounding options at the end of the contract, the 
likelihood is that any problems of information processing capacity will be exacerbated 
relative to more traditional HP and personal loan finance. Moreover, cognitive load is likely 
to be further increased where finance packages are offered in the same context as the car 
purchase itself. Some evidence specific to the car market indicates failure to integrate 
relevant financial information (Wonder, Wilhelm & Fewings, 2008). Lastly, one notable 
feature of PCP deals is that consumers must consider the situation they are likely to face at 
the end of the deal. Any “present bias” (Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2002) will 
lead them to weight this aspect of the deal less than the immediate benefits and costs. This 
may be strengthened by the deleterious effect of cognitive load on self-control (Baumeister, 
Vohs & Tice, 2007; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999; Ward & Mann, 2000; Fudenberg & Levine, 
2006). Lower self-control is linked to higher use of easy-to-access credit products 
(Gathergood, 2012). 
 
 
2.2 Boosting Comprehension 
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The above conclusions regarding cognitive capacity imply that consumers will be susceptible 
to marketing that gives prominence to key attractive features of PCP plans while making less 
salient the potential downsides. While this claim may be true of many products, it is likely to 
be particularly the case where cognitive capacity is so strongly taxed. One result is that PCPs 
may be an area where consumer advice is especially needed, to ensure that both positive and 
negative product features are made sufficiently salient. Building on Tversky & Kahneman’s 
(1981) notion that individuals build specific mental constructs to compare alternatives, Thaler 
(1999) developed the concept of mental accounting to describe the segregation and 
integration of economic choices. In the context of PCP plans, consumers might be aided most 
straightforwardly by ensuring that the most important information enters the mental account, 
or by framing information in such a way as to simplify or make more salient the key 
relationships to improve the integration of information into the consumer’s mental account. 
The present study focused on the provision of consumer advice and three specific types of 
framing manipulation, the empirical rationale for each of which is outlined in the following 
subsections. 
 
 
2.2.1. Minimum Total Cost 
 
One possible way to reduce the cognitive load associated with processing information about 
PCPs is to frame the cost of the deal as a simplified single figure. Summing the monthly 
payments with the initial deposit generates a Minimum Total Cost (MTC) figure that 
represents the minimum amount of money that the consumer has agreed to part with over the 
course of the deal. This is potentially a helpful way to simplify the mental account for a PCP 
plan, because regardless of what happens at the end of the deal the MTC will be exchanged 
for leasing the car over the term of the contract. Evidence from experimental studies of 
personal loans suggests that making financial cost information salient may improve 
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comprehension and influence decisions (Ranyard et al., 2006; McHugh et al., 2011). There is, 
however, a danger associated with an additional information disclosure in a context where 
consumers already struggle with the volume and complexity of information, even if in theory 
that disclosure integrates some of the existing information into a simplified form. In their 
loan study, Lunn et al. (2016) provide evidence that while presenting financial cost 
information may lessen bias, it may simultaneously reduce the consistency with which 
information is integrated into decisions. In the present study, we test the hypothesis that MTC 
information improves consumers’ rating of PCP deals. 
 
 
2.2.2 Weekly Mileage 
 
Another feature unique to PCP Finance is the mileage limit. If violated, the consumer must 
pay a fine proportional to the excess distance travelled. Violation also reduces the likelihood 
of emerging with positive equity at the end of the deal, as it decreases market value. In 
current PCP advertising, the mileage allowance is expressed annually. In Ireland it typically 
ranges from 10,000 km/year to over 30,000 km/year. Such large absolute figures may reduce 
the attention consumers apply to these important limits. Annual mileage may also be less 
intuitive, leading to underweighting of this attribute in decisions. 
 
 
Accumulations over time can be framed in multiple ways and there is existing evidence that 
choice of frame can affect how the information enters consumer decisions. For instance, 
reframing a large lump sum as a series of smaller ongoing expenses can increase transaction 
compliance (Price, 1994) – sometimes referred to as the “Pennies-a-Day” strategy (Gourville, 
1998). We hypothesise that framing the mileage limit as a smaller and perhaps more intuitive 
equivalent weekly mileage may make it more salient and easy to process, helping consumers 
to integrate the information into their assessments of PCP plans. 
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2.2.3 Explanatory Diagrams 
 
PCP plans straightforwardly contain more related attributes than HP deals. One possible way 
to help consumers to understand the relationships between the attributes is with the use of 
graphical diagrams. Diagrams can shift part of the burden of information processing to the 
perceptual system and thus enhance overall understanding (Lurie & Mason, 2007). Graphical 
aids can also promote causal inference relative to equivalent blocks of text (Mayer, 2002; 
Butcher, 2006; McCrudden, 2007). Hence, diagrams could help consumers to understand 
PCP plans by unlocking additional cognitive capacity or replacing textual information 
(Ainsworth, 2006). For example, one concern is whether consumers realise what components 
of a PCP deal the APR is charged on (the retail price minus both the deposit and GMFV). 
Graphical presentation of the relationships between components may help to overcome such 
difficulties. 
 
 
2.3 Hypotheses 
 
 
Combining the empirically established problems of comprehension associated with loans 
generally and the additional cognitive demands of PCP plans, we developed the following 
hypotheses for test in relation to our first research question regarding comprehension of 
PCPs: 
 
 
H1: PCP agreements will increase the inconsistency of consumer decision-making relative to 
more traditional finance agreements such as HP. 
H2: Consumers will make objective mistakes when evaluating PCP deals. 
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H3: Consumers will struggle to understand the main features of PCP plans based on standard 
marketing material. 
 
 
Based on the analysis of the previous section, we then developed the following hypotheses in 
relation to the potential to improve consumer comprehension of PCP deals: 
 
 
H4: Consumers’ comprehension of PCP plans will be improved substantially by independent 
consumer advice highlighting key features from their perspective 
H5: Consumers’ evaluation of PCP deals will improve when provided with MTC 
information. 
H6: Consumers evaluations will improve when mileage limits are expressed in weekly terms. 
H7: Consumers’ comprehension of PCP plans will improve in response to advice containing 
a diagram designed to illuminate the relationship between the main components of a PCP 
plan. 
 
 
3. Methods 
 
 
Given the exploratory nature of the research questions and hypotheses, our experimental 
study used multiple sequential tasks. In line with previous empirical work on loans, we 
deployed a mixture of choice, rating and judgment tasks, with the latter organised into 
MCQs. The experimental session consisted of eight stages: (1) initial briefing; (2) car 
preference selection; (3) Adaptive Choice Task (ACT); (4) Rating Scales (RS); (5) Multiple 
Choice Questions (MCQs); (6) advice intervention; (7) post-intervention MCQs; (8) post- 
intervention RS. These stages are summarised in Table 1. 
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3.1 Participants 
 
 
Participants were 100 consumers aged 20-65 years from the Dublin area, recruited by a 
market research company. The sample was balanced by gender, age and working status. 
Participants were paid €30 for participation and could win an additional €50 voucher through 
a lottery, entries into which were based on performance in stage 5 and 7 (see Appendix A for 
details). 
 
 
Table 1: Structure of Experiment 
 
Stage Task Description 
(1) Initial briefing Participants read a typical information sheet from providers 
describing PCP and HP deals 
(2) Car preference 
selection 
Participants selected a favourite and second favourite car from 
a selection of current leading models 
(3) Adaptive Choice 
Task (ACT) 
Multiple binary choices within a staircase procedure balanced 
preference for first versus second car against difference in the 
retail price or APR. Half sample choose among PCP deals; 
half HP deals 
(4) Rating Scales (RS) Participants rate PCP deal for good versus bad value on a 7- 
point scale 
(5) Multiple Choice 
Questions (MCQs) 
Participants respond to questions probing understanding of 
the components of a PCP deal 
(6) Advice 
intervention 
Participants read a consumers advice sheet. Half sample read 
regulator’s website advice; half read advice designed by 
experimenters that includes a diagram of a PCP 
(7) Post-intervention 
MCQs 
Participants respond to questions counterbalanced from Stage 
(v) 
(8) Post-intervention 
RS 
Participants rate PCP deals again for good versus bad value 
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3.2 Design and Materials 
 
 
The tasks were computerised. They were programmed in Python using the PsychoPy package 
(Peirce, 2007; 2009) and presented on 14” (1366x768) laptops. 
 
 
3.2.1 PCP Information Sheet 
 
Participants were given an initial one-page information sheet explaining a PCP agreement 
(provided in Appendix B). It was based on information given on websites of the main car 
dealerships and brands in Ireland. Thus, it was designed to mimic the type of information 
consumers receive from PCP providers when considering deals. Since the quality of this 
initial information was potentially an important determinant of performance and we did not 
wish to underestimate consumers’ capabilities, we combined the clearest text we could find 
from multiple sites. The quality of this sheet was therefore arguably somewhat higher than 
information a consumer might typically be given by an individual supplier. A brief 
description of HP appeared also. Participants had two minutes to read the sheet – enough to 
read through it carefully more than once. 
 
 
3.2.2 Car Preference Selection 
 
Participants negotiated a simple onscreen decision tree to select a first and a second 
preference car. A first screen showed four classifications (Small Hatchback, Regular 
Hatchback, Saloon, Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV)) from which participants clicked through to 
a second screen showing five options within the chosen class from the five most popular 
brands in Ireland: Ford, Nissan, Toyota, Hyundai and Volkswagen. They could click back to 
switch classifications as they wished. The full list of the cars is shown in Appendix C. 
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3.2.3 Adaptive Choice Task 
 
Participants (randomised into a PCP or HP condition) completed a series of binary choices 
designed to test the consistency of decisions. Their first preference car was presented on the 
left-hand side of the screen and their second preference car on the right-hand side, with each 
associated with a different PCP (or HP) plan. Screen shots depicting this task are shown in 
Appendix D. Responses were entered simply by clicking on the chosen offer. The offers 
presented followed an interleaved staircase procedure designed to locate balance points 
between the preference for the first over the second choice car and the difference in retail 
price or APR between the financial plans. Two staircases were “top-down”, meaning that 
they initially presented a much more expensive (retail price or APR) first preference car and 
narrowed the gap in steps, or “bottom-up”, meaning that they started with equivalent 
financial plans and made the first preference car steadily more expensive. Each staircase 
proceeded until it reversed direction twice. In addition, the PCP condition had a fifth staircase 
interleaved that presented two offers that both involved the favourite car, but where the 
GMFV had to be traded-off against the mileage limit. Additional trials were added to the HP 
condition to ensure that the overall length of the task was equivalent between conditions. 
More detailed information on the rules that governed the staircase procedure is provided in 
Appendix E. 
 
 
3.2.4 Rating Scales 
 
In the RS task, 12 single PCP offers were presented for participants to rate on a scale from 1 
to 7. The financial offers were the same for each participant, but the cars associated with 
them matched the brand preference shown in Stage 1. Trials were partially randomised to 
ensure that the same car did not appear consecutively. Unbeknownst to participants, trials 
were paired such that within each pair one offer strictly dominated the other. Pairs were the 
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same on all attributes except APR and mileage allowance, with one offer having a higher 
APR and stricter mileage limit. Detailed information on the prices of the cars displayed can 
be found in Appendix F. At this stage, participants were randomised into four conditions, 
with half presented with a weekly mileage alongside the annual limit and half presented with 
minimum total cost (MTC) information. This followed an orthogonal 2x2 structure, such that 
one quarter of participants received both manipulations and one quarter received neither. 
 
 
3.2.5 Multiple Choice Questions 
 
Eight MCQs were presented sequentially to test explicit understanding of the properties and 
operation of a PCP agreement. Two questions explored whether the components of a PCP 
deal were understood: what APR is charged on; how equity is calculated. These questions 
had four possible answers. Two questions were true/false questions and explored basic 
factual issues: who owns any equity at the end of the deal; whether equity is transferable. 
Four questions tested whether participants understood the direction of key relationships: 
higher GMFV implies lower repayments; higher second-hand car market implies increased 
chance of equity at the end of the deal; higher GMFV implies decreased chance of equity at 
the end of the deal; higher mileage allowance implies lower GMFV. These questions had four 
possible answers. Responses were given by simply clicking on one of the answers. 
 
 
After the initial set of questions was established, a second set was developed in which each of 
the relationships was inverted, e.g. the first set asked about the implications of higher GMFV 
for repayments while the other asked about the implications of lower GMFV. Half the 
participants answered the first set of questions, half answered the second. The full list of 
questions is given in Appendices G and H. 
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3.2.6 Advice Intervention 
 
Participants were randomly assigned to two conditions. In one they were given a written 
version of the advice on PCPs given on the website of the Competition and Consumer 
Protection Commission. The advice consisted of text designed to elucidate the pros and cons 
of PCPs. The second sheet, developed by the experimenters, focused on graphical aids 
designed to convey the relationships between different factors in a PCP agreement. The 
advice documents are provided in Appendices I and J. We refer to the two groups as the 
Textual Intervention (TI) and Graphical Intervention (GI) groups. 
 
 
3.2.7 Post-Intervention MCQs 
 
Participants were presented with whichever set of eight MCQs was the inverse of the set they 
tackled prior to the intervention. 
 
 
3.2.8 Post-Intervention RS 
 
In this final stage, participants repeated the RS task from Stage 4. 
 
 
3.3 Procedure 
 
 
The study was conducted in line with institutional ethical guidelines. It was undertaken in 
groups at the experimenter’s research institute, with up to five participants per group. Before 
and on arrival participants were informed that they were taking part in a study on choosing 
car finance. Participants were presented with an information sheet describing what to expect 
but were not informed of the purpose of the study nor of the funder, in order to minimise 
experimenter demand. Consent was otherwise informed. 
******** DRAFT ******** 
19 
 
 
 
In Stage 1, participants were invited to open an envelope on the table in front of them and 
told to read it carefully. After a period of two minutes – enough to read the sheet carefully 
more than once – they were instructed to return the sheets to the envelopes. They then 
proceeded to Stage 2, where they were asked to select a favourite and second favourite car. 
At Stage 3, participants were instructed always to choose their preferred option of the two on- 
screen deals. They could proceed at their own pace and each decision was preceded by a 
fixation cross3 for 500ms. 
 
When participants began Stage 4, it was stressed that they were no longer to respond 
according to how much they liked what was on offer. That is, they were to ignore whether the 
offer related to a hatchback or SUV etc., but instead to respond according to whether the offer 
represented objective good value. Participants clicked on the scale from 1 (“Not good value 
at all”) to 7 (“Very good value”) and were then asked to confirm their rating. A fixation cross 
was then presented for 500ms before the next trial. Ahead of Stage 5, participants were 
reminded that each correct answer increased their chances of winning a €50 voucher. After 
clicking on each answer they were invited to confirm their response before the next question 
was presented, following the 500ms fixation cross. 
 
 
At Stage 6, participants were invited to open a new envelope (which had been placed on the 
table in front of them during Stage 5) and to read the contents carefully. They had six minutes 
before they were instructed to put the documents back into the envelopes – enough time to 
read the entire document and revisit key parts as they wished. Following the intervention, 
participants were again asked to complete Stage 7 as for Stage 5 above, and lastly Stage 8 as 
for Stage 4. 
 
3 A small cross which appears in the centre of the screen between trials. 
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4. Results 
 
 
4.1 Adaptive Choice Task 
 
 
Participants’ consistency in Stage 3, the ACT, was assessed separately for each of the two 
trade-offs undertaken in the PCP and HP conditions (price difference versus car preference; 
APR difference versus car preference). For each trade-off, there was an upper branch 
(starting with a large price/APR difference and decreasing it in steps) and a lower branch 
(starting with equal price/APR and increasing the difference in steps) of the staircase. We 
first produced a best estimate of the implied price/APR difference at which participants were 
indifferent between their first and second choice car, following principles similar to those 
employed with staircase procedures in perceptual psychophysics. For each participant and 
staircase, we located the smallest price/APR difference reached by the upper branch and the 
highest price/APR difference reached by the lower branch, then calculated the mean 
price/APR difference of these and subsequent trials as our best estimate of the participant’s 
point of indifference. We then calculated the proportion of all responses that were consistent 
with this point of indifference.4 
 
The cumulative distributions of consistent responses by staircase and condition are shown in 
Figure 1. For the staircases where participants had to trade-off their choice of car against an 
APR difference, more inconsistent responses were recorded for participants in the PCP group 
compared to the HP group. Around half the sample produced entirely consistent responses. 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Data for three participants were discarded on the grounds that their responses were too erratic to estimate an 
indifference point. 
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The same pattern did not arise for the trade-off with the retail price, where the distributions of 
the proportion of inconsistent responses were closely similar between the two conditions. 
 
 
Figure 1: Proportion of consistent responses in ACT task (Stage 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
The number of inconsistent choices was modelled using Tobit regression, which takes 
account of left-censoring at zero. Dummy variables for gender, age, whether the participant 
had a degree and whether they were a car owner were included also. Results are presented for 
both the APR and retail price staircases in Table 2. In the APR condition, Model (1) finds 
that the number of inconsistent responses was higher in the PCP condition compared with the 
HP condition. This effect is significant at the 10% level, although the estimate here is 
conservative, since our hypothesis (H1) is directional and the reported significance level is 
for a two-tailed test. The number of inconsistencies was significantly lower among 
participants aged over 40 years and those with a degree. Model (2) shows that there was a 
significant interaction between the PCP condition and age. The pattern of coefficients implies 
that the PCP condition generated more inconsistent choices only amongst younger 
50 50 
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participants.5 The estimated effect size for younger participants is of similar magnitude to 
possessing a degree. Models (3) and (4) repeat this analysis for the retail price staircases. 
There was no equivalent effect of the PCP condition. Those with a degree were more 
consistent in their choices. 
 
 
Table 2: Tobit regressions for the number of inconsistent responses in the ACT task 
(Stage 3) 
 
 APR  Retail Price 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
PCP .101* (.057) 
.204** 
(.077) 
-.026 
(.048) 
.002 
(.068) 
Female -.012 (.056) 
-.011 
(.054) 
-.028 
(.048) 
-.026 
(.048) 
Age > 40 -.170*** (.063) 
-.046 
(.084) 
-.067 
(.052) 
-.039 
(.071) 
PCP*Age > 40  -.222** (.111) 
 -.056 
(.096) 
Degree -.178*** (.063) 
-.177*** 
(.062) 
.-147*** 
(.052) 
.-147*** 
(.052) 
Car Owner -.038 (.060) 
-.044 
(.059) 
-.055 
(.052) 
-.057 
(.052) 
Constant .113 (.079) 
.071 
(.081) 
.252*** 
(.066) 
.241*** 
(.069) 
N 97 97 97 97 
Pseudo R2 0.196 0.250 0.172 0.178 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
The remaining responses required those in the PCP group to trade-off GMFV against mileage 
allowance and monthly payment. A low GMFV increases repayments but also loosens 
mileage restrictions and increases the chances of equity at the end of the contract. We tested 
whether participants would reach a balance between these factors, or whether they would 
always favour one direction. Just over one third of participants (17) failed to home in on a 
point of indifference. In 12 cases, the participant reached the point where they accepted a 
 
5 We also tested for interactions of the PCP condition with gender and car ownership, both of which were non- 
significant and are excluded here for reasons of parsimony. Including these interaction terms does not alter the 
reported results. 
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mileage limit of just 5,000km, less than one third of average mileage for Irish car owners and 
half of the lowest limit offered in the market, at which point the staircase terminated. 
Similarly, in 5 cases participants reached a GMFV of just €3,500 for a three-year old car. We 
found no impact of age, gender, education or car ownership on the likelihood of homing in on 
a point of indifference. 
 
 
4.2 Rating Scales 
 
 
The mean rating given to offers in Stage 4, prior to the advice intervention, was 4.47 (sd = 
1.45). Rating differences were calculated for each dominant-dominated pair, such that a 
positive rating difference indicated that the objectively better offer (lower APR and higher 
mileage limit) had been rated more highly. Of the 600 pairs rated, this was the case for 303 
(50.5%). However, in 143 (23.8%) of cases, the dominant offer pair was rated as a worse deal 
than the dominated one. These frequent violations of dominance were not confined to a 
minority of participants: 71 of the 100 participants generated at least one violation among just 
six paired ratings. 
 
 
Rating differences passed standard tests for normality (Shapiro-Wilk, p > 0.5). To test for 
differences by condition, we estimated random intercept models with the rating difference as 
the dependent variable and the presence of weekly mileage and MTC information as 
covariates. Model (1) of Table 3 shows that neither information disclosure was of assistance 
to participants in rating the objectively better deal more highly. In fact, both estimated 
coefficients indicate a negative influence, with the negative influence of the MTC 
information statistically significant at the 10% level. We also tested for an interaction 
between the two disclosures, which was non-significant (not shown). Thus, there was a high 
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level of mistakes in the rating of the PCP deals, which was not helped by the additional 
information disclosures tested in Stage 4. 
 
 
Table 3: Random intercept models for the rating difference (dominant – dominated) in 
Stages 4 (Model 1) and Stages 4 and 8 (Models 2 and 3). 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Weekly Mileage -.110 (.198) .015 (.177) .014 (.165) 
MTC -.370 (.198)* -.139 (.177) -.289 (.177) 
TI Advice  .212 (.129)* .224 (.129)* 
GI Advice  .344 (.157)** .333 (.153)** 
Female   .288 (.173)* 
Age (Ref = 20-29)    
30-39   .304 (.262) 
40-49   -.197(.254) 
50+   -.166 (.270) 
Degree   .242 (.195) 
Car Owner   .074 (.191) 
Constant .818 (.190)*** .640 (.181)*** .391 (.290) 
Obs 600 1,200 1,200 
N 100 100 100 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
 
Ratings were taken again in Stage 8 following the consumer advice interventions. The 
number of pairs for which the dominant offer received a worse rating fell to 114 (19%), with 
59 participants making at least one error. Model (2) in Table 3 expands the regression 
analysis to include the pairs from Stage 8, testing separately for an effect of the two different 
consumer advice interventions. Both had a positive effect on the rating difference relative to 
pre-intervention performance, with the TI advice significant at the 10% level and the GI 
advice significant at the 5% level. 
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Two robustness checks were performed. First, although random assignment to condition is 
designed to ensure that observed differences are not due to individual differences, Model (3) 
nevertheless introduces a number of background variables, both as controls and to test for any 
differences by gender, age, education and car ownership. The primary results relating to the 
interventions are largely unaffected. Having a degree, car ownership and age have no impact, 
but the performance of females is estimated to be somewhat superior (significant at the 10% 
level). Second, while we chose the rating difference as our dependent variable in order to 
exploit the maximum variation in the data, it could be argued that the directional difference 
from zero is more important than variation in the rating difference away from zero, perhaps 
especially the likelihood of a negative difference that indicates dominance violation. Thus, 
we first re-estimated the model as a mixed-effects ordered logistic, with the rating difference 
categorised into three outcomes (negative, equal, positive), then again as a mixed-effects 
binary logistic (negative rating or not). Results for the interventions tested were closely 
similar to those in Table 3. The positive effect for females became significant at the 5% level 
in both models – women were significantly less likely to generate dominance violations. 
 
 
The above analysis focuses on mistakes (dominance violations) and whether interventions 
reduced the likelihood of error. Also of interest is whether the consumer advice had any 
overall effect on ratings of PCP deals. If participants had specific misconceptions that were 
altered by the advice, overall ratings might have changed as participants found PCP deals in 
general more or less appealing. To test this, we matched pre- and post-intervention pairs and 
computed the difference between ratings, with a positive difference indicating a higher rating 
post-intervention. Of the 1,200 pairs, for 473 (39.4%) the post-intervention rating decreased, 
while for 347 (28.9%) it increased. Employing a similar random intercept model to Model 1 
above, but with the post- versus pre-intervention difference as the dependent variable, we 
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tested the significance of this effect by condition. The form of advice (TI versus GI) had no 
significant effect (p > 0.1), but the effect did depend on the weekly mileage and MTC 
disclosures. Participants given the weekly mileage displayed greater decreases in ratings (β = 
-.423, s.e. = .212, p < 0.05) as did those given the MTC (β = -.318, s.e. = .173, p < 0.1), 
although there was a significant positive interaction between the two (β = .617, s.e. = .291, p 
< 0.05). Looking across this pattern of estimated coefficients, the upshot is that ratings were 
decreased significantly by the advice for participants who were given either piece of 
additional information, but not for those who were given both. 
 
 
4.3 Multiple Choice Questions 
 
 
Six of the eight MCQs had four possible responses while two MCQs had two possible 
responses. Thus, the expected total correct for a participant performing at chance was 2.5/8. 
The mean total correct in Stage 5 was 3.46 (sd = 1.32). Twenty-three of the 100 participants 
performed no better than chance, i.e. scored 2 or less. No participant scored the maximum 8. 
In Stage 6, following the consumer advice intervention, the number of correct scores 
increased, but did so differentially according to which intervention the participant received. 
The mean score following the TI advice was 3.98 (sd = 1.53), a significant increase (paired, 
t(98) = -2.65, p < 0.01). For GI advice it climbed to 5.22 (sd = 1.57), also a significant 
increase (paired, t(98) = -5.16, p < 0.001). The post-intervention mean score for the GI advice 
was significantly higher than that of the TI advice (unpaired, t(98) = -4.00, p < 0.001). 
 
 
Overall, 67% of the participants improved their total score following the intervention. 
Specifically, 76% of consumers improved their comprehension score following the GI 
advice, while 58% improved their comprehension score following the TI advice. The 
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proportion of correct responses pre- and post-intervention by the type of consumer advice 
intervention is shown for each of the eight individual questions in Table 4. Statistical 
significance was determined by estimating a separate logistic regression for each question, 
where the dependent variable was whether the response was correct, the intervention type 
was specified as two dummy variables and a separate dummy variable was included to 
control for which version of the question was asked pre- and post-intervention (see 
Subsection 3.2.5). 
 
 
The initial pattern of responses in Stage 5 indicates that participants struggled in particular to 
understand the impact of the second hand-car market on a PCP contract (Q2). Of the six 
questions with four responses, the question that related to the mileage-GMFV relationship 
(Q4) had the highest proportion of correct responses, while the proportion of correct 
responses on the other five questions did not exceed 38%. The TI advice significantly 
improved performance on two of the eight questions. The GI advice significantly improved 
performance on five questions, most of which related to relationships between the 
components of the PCP plan. 
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Table 4: Proportion of correct responses to MCQs pre- and post-intervention by type of 
consumer advice intervention 
 
No. Question Topic Response options 
Correct responses (%) 
Stage 5 Stage 6 (TI) Stage 6 (GI) 
 
Q1 
 
What is APR calculated on? 
 
4 
 
35 
 
38 
 
70*** 
 
Q2 Implication of 2
nd hand market 
movements? 
 
4 
 
27 
 
26 
 
62*** 
Q3 Is equity transferable? 2 50 66* 50 
Q4 Direction of mileage-GMFV relationship? 4 64 62 76 
Q5 How is equity calculated? 4 34 48 76*** 
Q6 Direction of GMFV- repayments relationship? 4 38 54** 70*** 
Q7 Who owns equity? 2 63 74 64 
Q8 Direction of equity-GMFV relationship? 4 35 30 54** 
 Total  43.3 49.8** 65.3*** 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
 
Additionally, we estimated a mixed logistic regression for responses to all questions, with the 
probability of a correct answer assumed to vary normally across individuals and control 
variables specified for which question was asked. This assumption is supported by our 
descriptive data, since the distribution of the number of correct responses across participants 
was approximately normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk, p > 0.5). The results are shown in the 
final row. The improvement associated with the TI advice was statistically significant at the 
5% level. The improvement associated with the GI advice was substantially greater and 
statistically significant at the 0.01% level. These results were unchanged by adding variables 
to the specification for gender, age, car ownership and whether the participant had a degree. 
Of these, only car ownership had a possibly significant influence on the likelihood of giving a 
correct response, although the effect (β = .221, s.e. = .125, p < 0.1) was weak relative to those 
associated with the TI advice (β = .307, s.e. = .130, p < 0.05) and, especially, the GI advice (β 
= .925, s.e. = .134, p < 0.001). The equivalent test comparing the two interventions revealed 
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that the GI advice significantly increased the probability of a correct response over and above 
the TI advice (p<0.001). Note that interacting these dummy variables with the specific 
questions generated a very similar pattern by question to that shown in Table 4 (not shown). 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
 
Given the lack of previous empirical consumer research on PCP finance, the present study set 
out to be exploratory in nature and to examine multiple hypotheses. In this final section we 
summarise the relevant findings with respect to each hypothesis, before considering the 
implications of the results for consumer policy and future research. 
 
 
5.1 Summary of Empirical Findings 
 
 
The findings offer some support for the hypothesis that PCPs reduce the consistency of 
consumer decisions relative to HP finance (H1). Consumers in the PCP group gave less 
consistent responses over a sequence of pair-wise choices in which preferences for model of 
car had to be traded off against APR, while no difference emerged in the equivalent trade-off 
against the retail price. Difficulty in understanding the credit aspect of a PCP deal is the 
obvious candidate to explain the difference, which was due to inconsistent responses among 
participants aged under 40. In addition, participants in the PCP condition also demonstrated 
some unusual choices in Staircase 5, wherein nearly a quarter of participants indicated that 
they would readily accept a mileage allowance of 5,000 km/year, an amount half that of the 
minimum mileage commonly offered by dealerships. While it is feasible that these 
participants (half of whom actually owned cars) may not use a car enough to violate this 
exceedingly low mileage allowance, it does imply that some of them may have been overly 
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attracted to the low monthly payments, despite the minimised future equity related to higher 
GMFVs. 
 
 
This difficulty was also evident when consumers undertook the rating scale (RS) task in 
which they had to rate PCP deals for value. Almost one quarter of the time participants 
judged a deal to be better value than another that was in fact objectively superior, because it 
offered a lower APR and a higher mileage limit but was otherwise identical. This clear 
violation of dominance supports the hypothesis that consumers will make objective mistakes 
when evaluating PCP deals (H2). 
 
 
Perhaps most striking, however, was performance in multiple choice questions (MCQs) that 
explicitly tested comprehension. The MCQs did not require any arithmetic, or indeed any 
kind of explicit calculation, only understanding of the essential elements of ownership, deal 
structure and directional relationships among key attributes. Yet, following exposure to 
standard marketing material of relatively high-quality, performance barely exceeded chance 
for a group of consumers who were incentivised to provide correct responses and more than 
half of whom were educated to at least degree level. This amounts to strong support for the 
hypothesis that consumers struggle to understand the main features of PCP plans (H3). 
Participants particularly struggled with questions related to the situation at the end of the 
contract, such as the likelihood of equity and how this relates to the GMFV and movement in 
the second-hand market. 
 
 
In sum, our first three hypotheses were supported and, consequently, the findings imply a 
clear answer to our primary research question. Consumers’ comprehension of PCP finance 
appears to be poor. 
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Our second research question was whether comprehension could be improved. Exposure to 
independent consumer advice both increased the number of correct responses to MCQs and 
reduced the frequency of dominance violations in the RS task, providing evidence for the 
usefulness of independent advice written from the consumer’s perspective (H4). However, 
two additional information disclosures we tested produced mixed results. Neither expressing 
the mileage limit as a weekly figure nor making explicit the minimum total cost (MTC) over 
the contract helped consumers to avoid dominance violations when rating deals. Indeed, the 
MTC intervention probably made matters worse. Thus, any improvement of comprehension 
associated with reframing this key aspect of the product may have been outweighed by the 
degree to which a further piece of information taxed cognitive capacity, given that consumers 
must already process multiple aspects of a PCP deal (retail price, APR, GMFV, mileage 
allowance, cost of credit, deposit, term, monthly repayments). Overall, therefore, we found 
little if any support for H5 and H6. However, while not assisting participants to make good 
relative comparisons, exposure to one of these disclosures (but not both simultaneously) did 
result in ratings in general falling after reading consumer advice. The implication may be that 
the disclosures are somewhat useful once essential elements of a PCP deal have been 
understood, but otherwise contribute to information overload. Finally, we recorded clear 
evidence that the consumer advice designed by the experimenters (GI), the main innovation 
of which was to display a diagram of the components of a PCP deal, had a larger effect on 
comprehension than the primarily text-based advice (TI) available online at the time of the 
experiment. This finding strongly supports H7. The advice containing the graphic was 
particularly effective in improving understanding of how the different components of a PCP 
plan relate to one another. 
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5.2 Potential Limitations 
 
 
Before considering the implications of the findings, it is apt to consider carefully the potential 
limitations of the present study. As with all laboratory experiments, thought must be given to 
the extent to which responses given in the lab are a guide to choices and behaviours in real- 
world settings. We discuss three issues. 
 
 
First, our study was hypothetical. It is possible, given the substantial sums involved, that car 
buyers devote more time and effort to understanding PCP deals than did our participants and, 
consequently, that they understand PCP deals better than our study implies. Although the 
results we present cannot rule this possibility out, they offer reasons to be sceptical of any 
such claim. Recall that participants were incentivised on a question-by-question basis and 
read the PCP marketing and advice material in the knowledge that they were about to face 
questions about it. They also displayed a substantial improvement in responses after reading 
the independent advice (especially in the GI condition). This improvement strongly indicates 
that participants tried hard to absorb information they were given and to produce good 
responses. It is ultimately a matter of judgement whether a typical car buyer tries to 
understand a PCP plan more determinedly than our participants did. However, given the 
extent of effort induced by our design and indicated by the data, we contend that a step-jump 
in comprehension from our participants to a typical car buyer is highly unlikely. In this 
context, recall also that the marketing material shown to participants at the beginning of the 
study (see Appendix B) was based on the material supplied by providers in the Irish market at 
the time of the study and selected to be the most easily understood material we could locate. 
Although this judgement is admittedly a subjective one made by the research team, the 
information placed before the average buyer is unlikely to be more helpful. 
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Second, the difficulty of the tasks in our study was set by the experimenters, so the absolute 
level of performance reflects this process as well as the comprehension of participants. The 
level of difficulty was not set arbitrarily, however, but on the basis of a judgement that failure 
to respond accurately would indicate a consumer protection issue. For instance, where 
consumers cannot make consistent choices between pairs of products, or rate offers that are 
objectively poorer than others more highly, when judged just moments apart, the indication 
may be that they will struggle to home in on good deals when conducting internet searches. 
Similarly, where consumers do not understand that when one component of a deal goes up 
another comes down, or that a choice made now has a specific consequence for their financial 
situation at a future date, there is an increased possibility that they will encounter an 
unpleasant surprise at some point after making a substantial financial decision. 
 
 
Third, the specific experimental design employed may have somewhat overestimated the 
influence of independent advice. We opted to compare responses to MCQs on a pre- and 
post- intervention basis, inverting each question between the two sets such that it had to be 
tackled afresh. With such a design, it is possible that some improvement took place simply 
because participants learned as they progressed through the session, or that while reading the 
independent consumer advice participants specifically sought to understand the issues probed 
in the first set of MCQs. We opted not to include a control group that received no advice 
because we wanted to devote statistical power to the difference between the two advice 
formats. Indeed, the fact that the two interventions had differential effects, both in terms of 
magnitude and focus, strongly suggests that the results were not driven by learning during the 
session. It remains possible that when reading advice participants sought information specific 
to the MCQs previously asked. If so they might have outperformed a cold reader and, 
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therefore, produced stronger performance in the second set of (inverted) questions. We 
cannot be certain, given present data. Again, however, the differential comprehension 
induced by the TI and GI advice suggests otherwise, since information sufficient to answer 
the specific questions was available in both. Furthermore, it is perhaps an unlikely strategy 
for participants to adopt. They did not know that they would be asked a second set of MCQs 
and it would in any case be a considerable feat of working memory to retain eight separate 
concepts while searching actively within a technical document for information specific to 
each. 
 
 
5.3 Policy Implications 
 
 
PCP plans should be considered a complex financial product. The scale of misunderstanding 
of PCP finance implied by the present study provides evidence that a substantial proportion 
of car buyers are unlikely to comprehend such deals. It should be noted that this does not 
necessarily imply that their decisions are at fault, nor that they will suffer any negative 
consequences. However, it does suggest that the likelihood of these eventualities may be 
higher than when consumers engage with products they understand better. The evidence 
presented here implies that car buyers may struggle to locate the better deals. Of perhaps 
particular concern is the difficulty of comprehending the factors that dictate the situation 
faced at the end of a PCP deal. Deals with relatively high GMFVs generate attractive low 
monthly repayments at the expense of worse financial circumstances at the end of the deal. A 
proportion of consumers may be surprised to discover that, having paid a substantial sum 
over, say, three years, cared well for a car and stayed within stringent mileage limits, they 
own little or no part of any useful asset in return. 
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These findings and the lack of previous studies suggest that PCP finance requires greater 
attention from consumer policymakers than has perhaps been acknowledged. Nevertheless, 
consumer protection concerns need to be balanced against the positive benefit of increased 
affordability that has accompanied the arrival of PCP plans. Evidence suggests that many 
standard financial products generate confusion among consumers. Studies now link various 
features of insurance products (Bhargava et al, 2017; Suter et al, 2017) and investment 
products (Beshears et al, 2011) to objective mistakes. Key elements of mortgage products are 
not well understood by homeowners (Lacko and Pappalardo, 2010) and those with poor 
financial literacy are more likely to choose riskier mortgages (Gathergood and Weber, 2017). 
The degree to which preferences for pension products are subject to framing effects (Brown 
et al, 2008) suggests they are not well understood either. These inconsistencies, biases and 
straightforward mistakes present a challenge for policymakers, where a balance must be 
struck that allows consumers to reap benefits yet protects them from pitfalls. The same is true 
of PCP plans. 
 
 
In this context, the current study provides strong evidence that consumers considering PCPs 
would benefit from good independent advice. It shows that comprehension of PCP plans can 
be improved substantially. Advice that included an explanatory diagram was particularly 
effective. The findings therefore raise the issue of how best to get effective advice in front of 
car buyers. The scale of miscomprehension revealed here might be taken to support a more 
interventionist approach, moving policy beyond the provision of independent information 
about PCPs that car buyers can seek if they wish, to the mandating of more effective 
disclosures at the point of sale. In keeping with the principles of empirically informed 
regulation (Sunstein, 2011) and given the regulatory costs involved, disclosures might be pre- 
tested for effectiveness to inform such a policy. 
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5.4 Future Research 
 
 
The findings point to a need, perhaps urgent, for more research to support consumer policy in 
this area. As stated at the outset, car purchase is one of the largest financial transactions 
households undertake. An innovative form of finance is increasing in popularity and, 
according to the evidence presented here, consumers struggle to understand the basics of how 
it works. An important research question, therefore, is how well consumers who have entered 
a PCP deal understand the terms of their contract and the situation they are likely to face 
when it comes to an end. Our results suggest a likely answer indirectly, but field studies or 
surveys could be potentially be deployed to obtain an answer directly. 
 
 
Another question not addressed in the current study is the degree of confidence that 
consumers have in their understanding of PCP deals. Work on financial literacy suggests that 
in some domains consumers are excessively confident in their understanding (OECD, 2005) 
and in general overconfidence is more likely when tasks are difficult or nearly impossible 
((Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein 1977; Kahneman and Tversky 1996), such as accurately 
assessing the future market value of a car . This is important, because overconfidence may 
make consumers less inclined to seek the sort of independent advice that our results show can 
be effective, potentially strengthening the case for stronger mandated disclosure. 
 
 
Lastly, despite demonstrating shortcomings in consumers’ comprehension, the current 
findings contain some grounds for optimism with regard to the effects of explanatory 
diagrams. Previous research has shown the benefits of diagrams in multiple domains of 
human understanding (Ainsworth, 2006). Our results suggest much potential for using 
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diagrams to improve consumer understanding of complex financial products. Moreover, the 
increased application of behavioural science to policy means that policymakers have 
similarly increased access to methods for designing and pre-testing diagrams as tools of 
information provision and disclosure. 
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Appendix A: Incentive System 
 
 
The incentive scheme operated on a raffle system, such that each participant began with their 
name in the raffle for a €50 voucher once. On correctly answering a question, their name was 
added to the raffle one more time. Therefore, the better they performed in the MCQs, the greater 
their chance of winning the voucher. This form of incentivisation works well in that, rather 
than simply rewarding those with the highest score (which could demotivate those who 
expected not to perform well relative to others), it rewards every correct answer equally with 
an improved overall chance of winning. Therefore, the motivation of participants is more likely 
to remain constant and common across participants. 
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Appendix B: Initial Information Sheet 
 
PCP 
PCP Explained 
A PCP is a Personal Contract Plan. It is a 2-3 year car finance package that enables people to obtain a new 
car for relatively low monthly payments, while also providing some flexibility regarding what to do at the 
end of the agreement. 
 
 
Under a Personal Contract Plan, once you have chosen a new car, you pay a deposit percentage of 
between 10% and 30% of the Retail Price. One way of doing this is by trading in your existing car and 
paying the remainder in cash. Next, you agree a mileage limit to adhere to for the length of the 
agreement. 
 
Finally, a portion of the car’s value is deferred until the end of the agreement. This amount is 
the minimum value that the car dealership guarantees your car will be worth at the end of your 
agreement, your Guaranteed Minimum Future Value (GMFV). You then pay an agreed monthly 
instalment over 24-36 months to cover the remainder of the car’s value at a set APR (Annual Percentage 
Rate). 
 
 
At the end of your agreement you have the following three options: 
Option 1: Renew your car 
You can upgrade your car to a newer model. Any excess value of your car over the GMFV can be used as 
equity for a deposit towards your new PCP car. 
 
Option 2: Return your car 
As long as your car meets our fair wear and tear standards, is within the agreed mileage, and your 
account is up-to-date, there will be nothing further to pay. Additional charges will be made if you exceed 
the agreed mileage or if your car does not meet our fair wear and tear standards. 
 
Option 3: Retain your car 
Make a one-off final payment equivalent to the GMFV and take ownership of the car. You do not own the 
car until you make this final payment. 
 
 
 
HP Explained 
Hire Purchase 
Hire Purchase is quite similar to a PCP agreement, in that you are financing the cost of your car over a 
period of time that you choose between 1 to 5 years. However, with HP, you are paying back the total 
cost of the car over the course of the agreement. After placing a deposit, equal monthly payments over 
the period of the agreement are agreed at a set APR (Annual Percentage Rate). Once all of the payments 
have been made, you become the owner of the vehicle. 
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Appendix C: List of vehicles 
 
Classification of Car Car Brand Car Model 
Small Hatchback Ford Fiesta 
Small Hatchback Nissan Micra 
Small Hatchback Toyota Yaris 
Small Hatchback Hyundai i10 
Small Hatchback Volkswagen Polo 
Regular Hatchback Ford Focus 
Regular Hatchback Nissan Pulsar 
Regular Hatchback Toyota Auris 
Regular Hatchback Hyundai i30 
Regular Hatchback Volkswagen Golf 
Saloon Ford Mondeo 
Saloon Nissan Qashqai 
Saloon Toyota Corolla 
Saloon Hyundai i40 
Saloon Volkswagen Passat 
SUV Ford Kuga 
SUV Nissan X-Trail 
SUV Toyota C-HR 
SUV Hyundai Tucson 
SUV Volkswagen Tiguan 
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Appendix E: Adaptive Choice Task – Staircase Procedure 
 
a) Staircase 1 (APR): In the first staircase, participants were initially presented with two 
identical deals for their first and second preference cars, with each deal offering an 
Annual Percentage Rate (APR) of 0%. On selection of their first preference car, the 
APR of this deal increased by 4%. Hence, the next time the participant was presented 
with a trial from Staircase 1, the finance deal for their favourite car was more expensive 
than the deal for their second favourite car, with Monthly Payments and Cost of Credit 
rising with the increasing APR. On selection of the second preference car, the APR of 
the first preference deal decreased by 4%. The prices displayed remained constant at 
€23,250, regardless of the cars displayed. 
 
b) Staircase 2 (APR): The second staircase operated as the opposite bracket of Staircase 
1. Rather than presenting two identical trials with 0% APRs, this staircase presented 
the second preference car deal with an APR of 0%, while the first preference car deal 
had a considerably higher APR of 20%, along with correspondingly higher Monthly 
Payments and Cost of Credit. On selection of the second preference car, the APR of the 
first preference deal decreased by 4%, while it increased by 4% on selection of the first 
preference car. The prices displayed remained constant at €23,250, regardless of the 
cars displayed. 
 
c) Staircase 3 (RRP): The third staircase operated in a similar fashion to Staircase 1. 
However, rather than increase the APR of the first preference deal on selection, the 
retail price increased by a step of €900, along with correspondingly higher Monthly 
Payments and Cost of Credit. On selection of the second preference car, the price of the 
first preference deal would decrease by €900. The initial price displayed for each deal 
was €28,750. 
 
d) Staircase 4 (RRP): The fourth staircase operated as the opposite bracket of Staircase 3. 
Rather than presenting two identical trials, this staircase presented the first preference 
car deal with a retail price €5,400 higher than that of the second preference, along with 
correspondingly higher Monthly Payments and Cost of Credit. On selection of the 
second preference car, the price of the first preference deal decreased by €900, while it 
would increase by €900 on selection of the first preference deal. The initial price 
displayed for the second preference car on the right was €28,750, while the price for 
the first preference car was €34,150. 
 
e) Staircase 5 (GMFV / Mileage Allowance): The fifth staircase was presented exclusively 
to participants in the PCP condition, as GMFV and Mileage Allowances are not relevant 
factors in a standard, traditional Hire Purchase agreement. For those in the HP 
condition, they were simply presented with a number of dummy trials in order to ensure 
that the total number of trials presented to participants in both groups remained 
approximately equal. 
 
In this staircase, instead of the first and second preference cars, participants were shown 
their favourite car on each side of the screen, each with a different PCP offer. On the 
left, they were presented with a deal that had a slightly higher GMFV and a slightly 
lower annual Mileage Allowance than the deal on the right. As the GMFV was higher, 
this also meant that the Monthly Payments and Cost of Credit were lower on the left- 
hand side. The car on the left initially displayed a GMFV of €9,500 with a Mileage 
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Allowance of 15,000 km/year, while the car on the right displayed a GMFV of €8,500 
with a Mileage Allowance of 16,000 km/year. On selection of the left-hand option, the 
left GMFV would increase by €2,000, with a decrease in Mileage Allowance of 2,500 
km/year. On selection of the right-hand option, the left GMFV would decrease by 
€2,000, with an increase in Mileage Allowance of 2,500 km/year. The prices displayed 
remained constant at €26,500, regardless of the cars displayed. 
 
 
Participants were shown trials from each of the five staircases in a semi-randomised order, in 
that the same staircase would not be shown twice in a row. The Adaptive Choice Task was 
terminated after the participant had made a minimum of two reversals on each of the five 
staircases (four staircases for those in the HP condition). For example, if the initial choice on 
Staircase 1 had been to choose the finance offer on the left, and the next choice on Staircase 1 
had been to choose the offer on the right, this counted as one reversal. If they then decided to 
choose the offer on the left, this counted as a second reversal. 
On committing one reversal on any staircase, that staircase was no longer presented to 
participants until a reversal was demonstrated on all but one of the remaining staircases. At this 
point, the reversed staircases would again begin to randomly appear. In a similar fashion, on 
committing a second reversal on any staircase, that staircase was no longer presented to them 
until a second reversal was demonstrated on all but one of the remaining staircases. At this 
point, the reversed staircases would again begin to randomly appear. 
In the event that participants demonstrated no clear reversal points on a staircase (i.e. 
continuing to select their first preference car regardless of the increasing cost), they reached a 
ceiling point, at which stage the staircase in question would cease to appear. 
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Appendix F: Rating Scales – Price Distribution 
 
The prices of the cars displayed were based on the average retail price of the cars in each 
category at the time of design. For example, the average Regular Hatchback price was taken 
from the average price of the Ford Focus, the Nissan Pulsar, the Toyota Auris, the Hyundai i30 
and the Volkswagen Golf. In order to promote variation in rating scores, 3% of this average 
Regular Hatchback price was added to and subtracted from the average in order to create a 
higher and lower range of expense. In this way, two Regular Hatchback deals with a price of 
3% below this average were presented, as well as two Regular Hatchback deals with a price of 
3% above this average. This variation was also applied to the deals in the Saloon. In the Small 
Hatchback class, two cars with a price of 3% below this average were presented, while in the 
SUV class, two cars with a price of 3% above this average were presented. 
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Appendix G: Multiple Choice Questions (Phrasing 1) 
 
1. In a PCP agreement, what is the APR (Annual Percentage Rate) charged on? 
a) The Retail Price of the car minus the GMFV 
b) The Retail Price of the car minus the initial Deposit 
c) The GMFV (Guaranteed Minimum Future Value) of the car 
d) The Retail Price minus both the initial Deposit and the GMFV 
 
2. Assume the second hand car market has done well over the course of your PCP deal 
and the price of a second-hand car has generally risen: 
a) This could be good for you because you have a greater chance of having 
positive equity at the end of your deal 
b) This could be bad for you as you will need to pay more to purchase your car at 
the end of your deal 
c) This has no relevance for you and your PCP agreement 
d) I don't know 
 
3. At the end of a PCP agreement, the dealer evaluates the market value of the PCP car. 
You can then use any positive equity on the car towards the final payment on the car 
in order to take full ownership: 
a) True 
b) False 
 
4. When establishing the mileage allowance for a PCP deal, the higher the mileage: 
a) The lower your GMFV should be 
b) The higher your GMFV should be 
c) Neither of the above 
d) I don’t know 
 
5. At the end of a PCP deal, the dealer evaluates the market value of the PCP car. If you 
wish to move onto a second PCP deal, what aspect of your previous PCP deal can be 
put towards your new deposit? 
a) Your original deposit from your first PCP agreement 
b) The market value of your first PCP car 
c) The difference between the market value of your first PCP car and its 
Guaranteed Minimum Future Value 
d) The Guaranteed Minimum Future Value of your first PCP car 
 
6. At the start of a PCP deal, the higher your GMFV: 
a) The lower your monthly payments 
b) The higher your monthly payments 
c) Neither of the above 
d) I don’t know 
 
7. At the end of a PCP agreement, the dealer evaluates the market value of the PCP car. 
If I choose to walk away and not purchase the car or enter into a second PCP 
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agreement, I am not entitled to be rewarded or make use of the positive equity on my 
PCP car for returning it in good condition: 
a) True 
b) False 
 
8. At the start of a PCP deal, the lower your GMFV: 
a) The lower your chances of having positive equity at the conclusion 
b) The higher your chances of having positive equity at the conclusion 
c) Neither of the above 
d) I don’t know 
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Appendix H: Multiple Choice Questions (Phrasing 2) 
 
1. The APR is applied to what component of the total price in a PCP agreement? 
e) The Retail Price of the car minus the GMFV 
f) The Retail Price of the car minus the initial Deposit 
g) The GMFV (Guaranteed Minimum Future Value) of the car 
h) The Retail Price minus both the initial Deposit and the GMFV 
 
2. Assume the second hand car market has done poorly over the course of your PCP deal 
and the price of a second-hand car has generally risen: 
e) This could be good for you because you have a greater chance of having 
positive equity at the end of your deal 
f) This could be bad for you as you will need to pay more to purchase your 
car at the end of your deal 
g) This has no relevance for you and your PCP agreement 
h) I don't know 
 
3. At the end of a PCP agreement, the dealer evaluates the market value of the PCP car. 
You cannot take advantage of the good condition of your car as a contribution 
towards the final balloon payment required to purchase the car: 
c) True 
d) False 
 
4. When establishing the mileage allowance for a PCP deal, the lower the mileage: 
e) The lower your GMFV should be 
f) The higher your GMFV should be 
g) Neither of the above 
h) I don’t know 
 
5. If you wish to switch to a second PCP deal at the end your first deal, your deposit for 
the second deal can be a combination of cash and which aspect of your first PCP deal? 
e) Your original deposit from your first PCP agreement 
f) The market value of your first PCP car 
g) The difference between the market value of your first PCP car and its 
Guaranteed Minimum Future Value 
h) The Guaranteed Minimum Future Value of your first PCP car 
 
6. At the start of a PCP deal, the lower your GMFV: 
e) The lower your monthly payments 
f) The higher your monthly payments 
g) Neither of the above 
h) I don’t know 
 
7. At the end of a PCP agreement, the dealer evaluates the market value of the PCP car. 
If you choose to walk away and not purchase the car or enter into a second PCP 
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agreement, you are entitled to be rewarded with positive equity as compensation if 
you return the car with a market value greater than that of the GMFV: 
c) True 
d) False 
 
8. At the start of a PCP deal, the higher your GMFV: 
e) The lower your chances of having positive equity at the conclusion 
f) The higher your chances of having positive equity at the conclusion 
g) Neither of the above 
h) I don’t know 
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Appendix I: Textual Intervention (TI) Document 
 
What You Need to Know about PCP Deals 
Pros 
 Low monthly repayments 
 Small deposit 
 A choice of what to do at end of repayment term 
 Quick and easy to arrange 
Cons 
 Mileage and condition of car affects the costs 
 Have to pay the Guaranteed Minimum Future Value (GMFV), a large final payment to own the 
car at the end of the contract 
 You don’t own the car until you make this final payment 
 May not be able to afford repayments in the future if your circumstances change 
 You need permission from the finance company (owner) if you need to sell the car during the 
term of the contract 
 Final payment or GMFV may not be an accurate reflection of future market value of the car 
Many car dealers are now offering finance in the form of a Personal Contract Plan (PCP) to 
consumers when they are buying a car. PCPs can appear very attractive because of the low monthly 
repayments and the convenience of being able to buy your car and sort out your finance in the same 
place. However, it is important to understand how these products work before you sign a PCP 
contract. 
 
How does a PCP work? 
A PCP is a type of hire purchase contract. You don’t own the car until you have made the final 
payment. With a PCP, payment is broken down into three parts: 
 
The deposit – the deposit is typically between 10% and 30% of the value of the car, depending on the 
finance provider. Your deposit can be paid in cash or if you already own a car, you can trade this in 
for part or all of the deposit, depending on its value. 
 
Monthly repayments – PCP contracts are usually made for terms of at least three to five years. PCPs 
generally have low monthly repayments, which can make them seem more affordable compared to 
other forms of finance. 
 
Guaranteed Minimum Future Value ( GMFV ) ,a large, final payment, is how much it will cost 
you to own the car at the end of the contract. It takes into account such things as, the car you are 
buying, length of the contract, the condition of the car at the end of the contract and your annual 
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mileage. This final payment is set at the beginning of the contract, based on the finance company’s 
estimate of the future value of the car. If you are entering into another PCP the GMFV is subject to 
you meeting all the terms and conditions, including any mileage restrictions, you agreed at the start. 
 
When your contract ends 
 
At the end of the PCP contract, there are a number of options: 
 
Pay the GMFV, to own the car. There may be other fees associated with buying the car for example 
acceptance fees or completion fees which should be outlined in your PCP contract. You could also 
refinance the GMFV by taking out a new finance contract as the GMFV can be a large sum of money. 
This would meant you are entering into another financial contract 
Hand the car back. Be aware that if you do decide to hand the car back, while you generally don’t 
have to pay the dealer anything, you might end up having to pay a penalty if you have not met all the 
terms and conditions, for example, if you have exceeded any mileage restrictions agreed at the start of 
the contract or if there is excessive ‘wear and tear’ on the car. You also will no longer have the car. 
Enter into another PCP contract to buy a new car. It is important to be aware that the deposit you 
put down for the first car will not be given back to you. If the market value of the car from your 
first/previous PCP contract is greater than the GMFV, then you may have equity to put towards a 
deposit on the new car. However this will depend on the market value of the car at the time so you 
may need to pay a new cash deposit, depending on the difference between the GMFV on the first car 
and its market value at the end of the contract. You should check the contract or ask the dealer for 
details on what happens if you decide to enter into another PCP contract in the future. 
 
Comparing a PCP with a personal loan 
The main difference between a PCP and a personal loan is that with a personal loan you borrow the 
money, pay for your car, and own it immediately. With a PCP contract you don’t own the car, you are 
essentially hiring it for an agreed period of time, typically three to five years. You only own it if you 
pay the GMFV. This is important because if you were to run into financial difficulty during the term 
of your contract you would need permission from the finance company to sell the car to pay off your 
debt, as they are the legal owner of the car. 
 
How flexible is a PCP? 
These contracts are among the least flexible forms of finance. Because the repayments are fixed for 
the term of the contract, you usually cannot increase your repayments each month if you wish to do 
so. If you want to extend the term, you may be charged a rescheduling fee. 
 
What to watch out for 
Before you sign up to a PCP make sure you know who is providing you with the finance, that you 
fully understand the terms and conditions attached and you know what other things you need to look 
out for such as: 
 
Mileage: At the outset you agree the number of kilometres you are going to clock up over the period 
of the contract. If you keep to this, the car will have a GMFV at the end of the contract. If you exceed 
the agreed annual mileage you may find that you owe more on the final payment than you think – 
even if you were to hand the car back it would cost you money. This is often charged at a set fee per 
kilometre over the agreed limit. 
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Difficulty making repayments: You may be allowed to sell the car to clear the debt but you will 
need to get permission from the finance company to do this. Hire purchase contracts, which include 
PCP, allow you to end your contract and give back the car once you have paid half the hire purchase 
price – this is called the half rule . Because a lot of the cost of the car is deferred to the end with PCP, 
you may be close to the end of the contract by the time you reach the halfway point but ending your 
contract in this way may be an option. 
 
Small print: At the beginning of the contract you will agree to a number of different terms and 
conditions. For instance, the cap on the number of miles/kilometres you are allowed to clock up over 
the period of the contract. You may also be asked to commit to certain car servicing requirements. 
Always read the small print before you sign up. 
 
Finance options: When comparing finance options, take the time to compare the total amount 
payable on a personal loan ( cost of credit ) with the PCP cost (the deposit, plus monthly repayments 
and final payment). Use our personal loan cost comparison to help you. Make sure you also compare 
the terms and conditions of each option. 
 
Fees and charges: Always ask about any additional fees and charges. You are entitled to a list of all 
additional charges and fees, so ask the garage for this before you sign up to any contract. For instance, 
ask if there is any documentation fee for setting up the contract, missed repayments fees or 
repossession charges. 
 
Outstanding finance: It is worthwhile checking the registration documents of a second-hand car to 
make sure that it is not already owned by a finance company, in which case the person trying to sell 
you the car does not actually own it and may not have the right to sell it to you. 
 
How is interest charged? 
If interest is charged, the rate on PCPs will vary depending on the finance company and the car you 
are financing. Interest is calculated at a fixed rate on the total amount you borrow for each year of the 
contract. If you pay off the contract earlier than planned, this will often work out more expensive than 
if you had taken out a variable rate personal loan. Also, the deposit you pay at the beginning of the 
contract will have an impact on the amount of interest you pay. 
 
Can your car be repossessed? 
With a PCP, your car can be repossessed if the terms of the contract are broken, for example, by 
missing repayments. If you have paid less than one-third of the purchase price, the car finance 
company can take back your car without taking legal action against you. If you have paid more than 
one-third of the purchase price, a lender cannot repossess the car without taking legal action. In 
addition, the car cannot be repossessed from your home, regardless of how much money you’ve paid 
back. 
 
If your car is repossessed, the finance company will generally sell the car and the money goes towards 
the outstanding debt, but you will still have to make repayments until the entire debt is paid off. 
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Appendix J: Graphical Intervention (GI) Document 
What You Need to Know About PCP Deals 
A PCP (Personal Contract Plan) is a type of hire purchase contract. However, it is 
fundamentally different from a standard, traditional hire purchase agreement. This is 
because you are not paying off the full cost of the car through monthly repayments. Rather, 
you are paying off the difference between the Retail Price and the predicted future value of 
the car at end of the deal. You don’t own the car until you then make a final payment equal to 
the GMFV. What you pay is broken down into three parts: 
 
1. The deposit – the deposit, paid at the start, is typically between 10% and 30% of the 
value of the car. Your deposit can be paid in cash or if you already own a car, you can 
trade this in for part or all of the deposit, depending on its value. 
2. Monthly repayments – PCP contracts usually last at least two to three years. PCPs 
generally have low monthly repayments, which can make them seem more affordable 
compared to other forms of finance. 
3. Guaranteed Minimum Future Value (GMFV) - a large, optional final payment. 
This is how much it will cost you to own the car at the end of the contract. This final 
payment is set at the beginning of the contract, based on the finance company’s 
estimate of the future value of the car. It takes into account such things as; the car you 
are getting, the length of the contract and a set annual mileage limit. 
 
 
 
See the examples below of a PCP deals for a car with a retail price of €20,000 on a three 
year contract with a fixed APR (Annual Percentage Rate) of 4% and a Mileage 
Allowance of 20,000 km/year. 
 
In this example, the car has a GMFV of €10,000. With a deposit of €3,000, this leaves the 
remaining amount (displayed in blue) to be paid through monthly instalments. 
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How do the factors of a PCP deal interact? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When happens when your contract ends? 
At the end of the PCP contract, there are a number of options: 
 
1. Pay the GMFV to own the car. 
 
2. Hand the car back. 
In this scenario you will have paid to rent a car for three years. Provided you have not 
exceeded your mileage allowance and the car does not have excessive wear and tear, 
you can simply return the car and walk away. However, if you have exceeded the 
agreed annual mileage limit you will have to pay a fine, generally at a set fee per 
kilometre over the agreed limit. 
 
3. Enter into another PCP contract to get a new car. 
The difference between the market value of a car and its GMFV is referred to as 
‘equity’. For example, if the market value of a car is €12,000 and the GMFV for that 
car is €10,000, then you have ‘positive equity’ of €2,000. 
 
Your potential equity depends on the condition of your car (wear and tear / 
mileage) and what the second-hand market for that car type looks like at the end 
of the contract. 
Minimum Total Cost: This is the minimum amount that you are agreeing to hand over to 
the dealer, even if you decide not to pay the GMFV at the end of the deal. It is the sum of 
the Deposit and all of your Monthly Payments. 
Monthly Payments: The more you pay in monthly instalments, the more you are 
“borrowing” over the course of the deal. As it is this “borrowed” amount that the APR is 
charged on, the higher your monthly payments, the more interest you will be charged. This 
increases both the Minimum Total Cost and the overall Cost of Purchasing the PCP car 
(€20,450). 
GMFV: The higher your GMFV (€10,000), the lower the proportion of the total cost of the 
car you are paying off through monthly instalments. In other words, the higher your GMFV, 
the lower your Monthly Payments will be. However, remember that a higher GMFV means 
a larger final payment to actually buy the car at the end of the deal. 
Deposit: The higher your Deposit (€3,000 in the example above), the more you paying 
upfront for the car, so the less you are borrowing and paying back over the course of the 
deal. Therefore, the less you are required to pay through Monthly Instalments (€200 per 
month in the example above). 
Mileage: If you select a higher annual Mileage Allowance (20,000 km/year) for the term of 
the deal, it is expected that the car will have more miles on the clock at the end of the deal, 
which will reduce what it is worth. Therefore, the higher your Mileage Allowance, the 
lower the GMFV. 
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If you have positive equity, you can put this towards a deposit on the new PCP deal. 
This is the only guaranteed way to use any positive equity from your existing PCP 
deal. 
 
However, if the market value falls below the GMFV, you will not have any equity to 
contribute to the deposit on a new PCP contract, and you may be required to pay off 
this ‘negative equity’ (if you have not abided by the mileage and wear & tear 
allowances). 
 
How are the monthly payments calculated? 
The total amount you borrow is the Retail Price of the car minus both the Deposit and the 
GMFV. Interest is calculated at a fixed APR on this amount. This is then divided by the 
length of your contract, giving you your monthly payments. The higher the APR, the more 
interest you will be charged. 
 
What’s the difference between a PCP deal 
and a personal loan? 
The main difference between a PCP and a personal loan is that with a personal loan you 
borrow the money, pay for your car, and own it immediately. With a PCP contract you don’t 
own the car, you are essentially hiring it for an agreed period of time, typically two to three 
years. You only own it if you pay the GMFV. This is important because if you were to run 
into financial difficulty during the term of your contract you would need permission from the 
finance company to sell the car to pay off your debt, as it is the legal owner of the car. 
 
How flexible is a PCP? 
These contracts are among the least flexible forms of finance. Because the repayments are 
fixed for the term of the contract, you usually cannot increase your repayments each month if 
you wish to do so. If you want to extend the term, you may be charged a rescheduling fee. 
 
What should I watch out for? 
Before you sign up to a PCP make sure you know who is providing you with the finance, that 
you fully understand the terms and conditions attached and you know what else you may 
need to look out for such as: 
 
Mileage: At the outset you agree the number of kilometres you are going to clock up over the 
period of the contract. If you keep to this and the car is kept in good condition, it will have a 
have a minimum value equal to the GMFV at the end of the contract. If you exceed the 
agreed annual mileage you may find that you owe more on the final payment than you think – 
even if you were to hand the car back it would cost you money. This is often charged at a set 
fee per kilometre over the agreed limit. 
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